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Abstract

This research project examines the relationship between urbanization and political
party competitiveness in Mississippi. Using elections results from the 2011 and the 2015
Mississippi House of Representatives races, this project seeks to find if there is a
relationship between urbanization and competitiveness in Mississippi, and if not, which
factors do affect competitiveness. Previous research indicates that as an area urbanizes,
its elections become more competitive among different political parties. However, this
study finds that there is no clear correlation between urbanization and party
competitiveness in Mississippi elections, and that other factors, including race, education,
and geographic location, may have more influential roles.
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I. Introduction
2015 was a record setting year for lack of party competitiveness in elections
across the country. Specifically for legislative elections, the percentage of general
elections with two major party candidates running was at an all time low. Nation-wide,
407 out of 5,411 state representative seats were up for re-election, because only four
states held state elections in 2015: Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia.1 In
Mississippi, out of the 122 House of Representatives races, 42 races had more than one
party running, resulting in only 34.4% of Mississippi House of Representative races
being multi-party competitive at all. Six out of those 42 races had a different party win,
meaning 85.7% of the ‘competitive’ seats remained with the party who previously held
them. Of the 42 races with multiple parties, incumbents won 64.3% of the seats. Only 17
out of the 122 races had candidates that received votes within 28% of each other.2 What
do all of those statistics indicate? Mainly, that Mississippi legislature elections are not
very competitive at all. This study explores which factors influence competitiveness
within state legislative races.
According to US Census Bureau data, the US has been urbanizing at an average
rate of 1.76% each decade since the 1970s. Over the same time period, Mississippi has
been urbanizing at a rate of 1.23% each decade, not far behind the national average.
Previous research indicates that one of the leading causes of party competitiveness within
states is urbanization. Many scholars have concluded that as an area—whether it be a

1
“2015 state legislative elections analyzed using a Competitiveness Index,” Ballotpedia, accessed
March 11, 2016,
https://ballotpedia.org/2015_state_legislative_elections_analyzed_using_a_Competitiveness_Index.
2
“Official 2015 Election Results,” Mississippi Secretary of State, accessed November 17, 2015,
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/2015-General-Election.aspx.

1

city, county or district—urbanizes, its elections become more party competitive. This
study applies that theory to Mississippi, testing it on the 2015 Mississippi House of
Representatives elections. This study seeks to find if urbanization and population density
are indicators of competitiveness in Mississippi. It also explores if other factors are more
influential on party competition than urbanization.
This study seeks to explain what role those factors play in Mississippi elections,
and what the future implications are for Mississippi politics. It adds to the existing
literature on urbanization and party competitiveness by using Mississippi state races as
the case study and by adding different variables, including race, educational attainment,
geographic location.

2

II. Literature Review
One of the first published studies examining the relationship between urbanization
and party politics was by V.O. Key in his 1949 book, American State Politics. Key
compared the voting behavior between metropolitan and non-metropolitan voting areas in
several different northern states.3 Key’s work is limited, however, because it noted that
there were differences among voting behaviors in metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas, but did not attempt to explain the factors that could have affected the behaviors.
Stimulated by Key’s study, Heinz Eulau conducted a study of urbanization and
political parties in 1957. Eulau analyzed the relationship between Ohio’s counties’
ecological structures-- the pattern of the distribution of residential people-- and the
political party system from 1946-1956. He concluded that there is a direct relationship
between the ecological structures of the counties and the structure of the party systems;
that both semi-competitive and truly competitive party systems correlate with urban
ecological structures, while one-party systems correlate to rural structures; and that
“increasing urbanization would seem to be conducive to the further development of a
competitive party system as a structural requisite of the democratic political system.”4
A few years later, other researchers conducted a similar study to Eulau’s, but
focused mainly on Iowa and used slightly different measurements, urbanization indexes,
and definitions.5 Their results did not align with those of Eulau, and found that in Iowa,

3

V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 230-246.
Heinz Eulau, “The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The Case of Ohio,” Midwest Journal of
Political Science 1, No. 2 (Aug., 1957): 125, accessed March 10, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109076.
5
David Gold and John R. Schmidhauser, “Urbanization and Party Competition: The Case of
Iowa,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV, (1960), 64, 72, accessed March 30, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/2108756?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
4
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urbanization was not strongly associated with party competition.6 While these studies
were some of the first to directly study urbanization and party competition, both studies
only examined state, and neither study one accounted for factors besides urbanization that
might have a greater influence on competition than urbanization, which may help to
explain why each study concluded with different findings.
Another study by Phillips Cutright used both the Eulau and Gold studies, but
applied standardized measures to the Ohio and Iowa cases, compared state-wide races
rather than county-level races, and added eight other states to support the findings.
Because this study only looked at races from one year, Cutright changed the percentage
of votes a county must give a candidate of the two-party vote from 40% to 37% in efforts
to help prevent one-time factors from affecting the results of the study. This threshold set
the qualifications for what was considered ‘competitive.’ This study concluded, like
Eulau, that “urbanization is positively associated with competitive party voting behavior”
when standardized measures are applied.7 It also found that other factors, such as levels
of manufacturing employment and levels of religious homogeneity, affect urbanization
and must be controlled for the effect of competitive politics and “urbanization to
persist.”8
This same hypothesis was later used again, but applied it to inter-party
competition instead of multi-party competition, and introduced regional controls by
examining states separately. It found that while urbanization may increase competition

6

Gold, 1960.
Phillips Cutright, “Urbanization and Competitive Party Politics,” The Journal of Politics 25, No.
3 (Aug., 1963): 553,
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/2127972?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
8
Ibid, 564.
7
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among different parties, no significant associations exist between urbanization and interparty competitiveness, and that little evidence exists of associations between socioeconomic factors and inter-party competitiveness.9
While some researchers argue that urbanization is the most influential factor of
party competitiveness, many researchers argue that gerrymandering is most important.
Gerrymandering is “manipulating the boundaries of an electoral constituency to favor one
party or class.”10 Typically, people view gerrymandering as a partisan political move to
either intentionally “pack” a district with particular group of voters or to “crack” and
divide a district to prevent a group from having a majority vote.11 In efforts to prevent
partisan gerrymandering, many states have passed legislation detailing more fair and
objective ways to draw district lines. For example, Florida has mandates that require
“newly drawn congressional and state legislative districts be compact and contiguous in
shape.”12 While initiatives such as those may help reduce intentional partisan
gerrymandering, they create districts unintentionally gerrymandered by geography.
Previous research indicates that one of the main causes of this unintentional
gerrymandering is urbanization. A 2013 study explored this idea that human geography
plays a larger role in creating electoral bias than intentional gerrymandering does. This
unintentional bias is produced by the asymmetric patterns of the voters’ residences. The

Charles M. Bonjean and Robert L. Lineberry, “The Urbanization-Party Competition Hypothesis:
A Comparison of all United States Counties,” The Journal of Politics 32, No. 2 (May, 1970): 305-321,
accessed February 1, 2015,
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/24208/Bonjean_Lineberry_1970.pdf?sequence=1.
10
“Gerrymandering,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gerrymander, accessed March 31, 2015.
11
“Redistricting the Nation,” Azavea, last modified 2009,
http://www.redistrictingthenation.com/glossary.aspx
12
Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, “Tobler’s Law, Urbanization, and Electoral Bias: Why
Compact, Contiguous Districts Are Bad for the Democrats,” The Society for Political Methodology,
accessed March 10, 2015, http://polmeth.wustl.edu/node/314.
9
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study explains that “democrats live disproportionately in dense, homogenous
neighborhoods in large cities that aggregate into landslide Democratic districts, or they
are clustered into minor agglomerations that are small relative to the surroundings.”13 In
contrast, Republicans live in geographically larger and less populated suburban and rural
neighborhoods that are more “moderately Republican and politically heterogeneous.”14.
Other studies also support those conclusions regarding geography and
gerrymandering. One researcher argues that a pro-Republican bias is found under all
districting regimes, not just when partisans are drawing districts, and that asymmetric
population distribution is a likely explanation for bias, but not the only potential cause.15
A study conducted on the voting patterns of metropolitan regions in the US concludes
that there is an association between urban cities voting more for Democratic candidates
and suburban areas voting more for Republican candidates.16 Another study concludes
that any redistricting plan that creates relatively condensed, contiguous districts will
typically produce bias against the urban party, regardless of which party it is.17
The most commonly known form of gerrymandering is partisan gerrymandering,
where the lines are construed to benefit one political party over another. While some
partisan gerrymandering is done illegally for party advantage, it is often times required by

13

Chen and Rodden, 264.
Ibid., 264.
15
Nicholas Goedert, “Gerrymandering or Geography?” How Democrats Won the Popular Vote
but Lost the Congress in 2012,” Research and Politics (April/ June 2014): 7, accessed February 2, 2015,
http://sites.lafayette.edu/goedertn/files14/07/RP-2014-Goedert.pdf.
16
Jen Nelles, “The Missing Metros: The Voting Patterns and Political Influence on Metropolitan
Regions in US Presidential Elections, 1952-2012,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois, August 29- September 1, 2013.
17
Chen and Rodden, 241.
14
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the courts and legislation in efforts to protect racial minorities.18 This type of
gerrymandering is often used when all three parts—the Senate, House, and Executive—
of the State government are controlled by the same party. One scholar argues that
partisan gerrymandering is used when the party attempts to get rid of several of the
opposing party’s incumbents. This may lower the probability of reelection for the
majority’s party incumbents, but may increase the number of seats the majority held in
expectation.19
More recently, bipartisan gerrymandering has become the most common form of
gerrymandering. Unlike partisan gerrymandering where a specific political party is
advantaged, this is helpful for both parties and, many scholars argue, helpful for
incumbents and creates an “incumbency advantage.”20 In most cases, members of both
parties work on committees when redrawing district lines, often allowing legislators to
choose their voters, which has been made easier by recent advances in technology.21 A
2009 study, however, argues that while bipartisan gerrymandering does play a role in
incumbents’ reelections, the number of restraints on how redistricting can be done
overshadows that. Efforts to create majority-minority districts and the creation of new

Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, “Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering,”
The University of Chicago Law Review, 78, No. 2 (Spring 2011):553-604,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837778##.
19
John N. Freidman and Richard T. Holden, “The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What’s
Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?” Journal of Politics, 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2009): 593-611,
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5470108&fileId=S002238160
9090483.
20
Friedman and Holden, 609.
21
Brace W. Kimball. ‘‘Technology and Redistricting: A Personal Prospective on the Use of
Technology in Re- districting over the Part Thirty Years,’’ The Brookings Institute Conference on
Congressional Redistricting, (April 26, 2004): 2,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2004/4/16politics/crc_brace.pdf.
18
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avenues for groups and individuals to challenge proposed plans, both limit the power of
those who are redrawing the lines.
The limitations to all of these above studies on gerrymandering is that while they
all touch on the effects of gerrymandering on voter behavior, they do not directly explore
the relationship between gerrymandering and party competitiveness.
Other researchers use party competitiveness to help explain other electoral
factors. One study examined gubernatorial races in the US from 1977-2005 and found
that greater two-party competitiveness is associated with the greater success for thirdparty candidates.22 Another study compared party competitiveness and income
representation among state electorates from 1980-2008. Its results found no correlation
between competitiveness and how income biases were represented, and indicates that the
effects of party competitiveness are not uniform across different states.23 Another study
examines the relationship between party competition and political contributions in the
2012 Presidential election. It finds that in most cases, the most competitive races received
the most contributions, and that big businesses and corporations contribute nearly the
same to both Republican and Democratic candidates.24 These most recent studies on
party competitiveness are limited, however, because they only consider the political

Robin E. Best and Steve B. Lem, “Electoral Volatility, Competition, and Third-Party
Candidacies in US gubernatorial Elections,” Party Politics 17, no. 5 (September 2011): 611-628, accessed
March 28, 2016, http://ppq.sagepub.com.lynx.lib.usm.edu/content/17/5/611.full.pdf+html.
23
Amber Wichowsky, “Competition, Party Dollars, and Income Bias in Voter Turnout, 19802008,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 2 (April 2012): 446-459, accessed March 28, 2016,
http://ppq.sagepub.com.lynx.lib.usm.edu/content/17/5/611.full.pdf+html.
24
Thomas Ferguson, Paul Jorgensen, and Jie Chen, “Party Competition and Industrial Structure in
the 2012 Elections: Who’s Really Driving the Taxi to the Dark Side?” International Journal of Political
Economy 42, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 3-41, accessed March 29, 2016,
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.lynx.lib.usm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=df447cc5-27ff-4bd4-87ae4b41f21f8763%40sessionmgr102&vid=11&hid=109.
22
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effects that competitiveness creates rather than the factors that create competitiveness
within a race.
Most recently in urbanization studies, many researchers have been examining the
role of race within urbanization, finding that one common effect of urbanization is racial
residential groupings and racially polarized voting patterns. Research indicates that urban
areas have high black populations,25 which tends to create a segregated voting block.26
The limitations to these recent studies are that while researchers do examine urbanization
and some of its political effects, urbanization is not studied as a factor of multi-party
competitiveness.
Despite much study of urbanization and party competitiveness separately, there is
surprisingly little research that considers the relationship between the two. The studies in
which urbanization and party competitiveness is explicitly examined are outdated and fail
to include other factors that could better explain competition. Furthermore, there is no
research to date on urbanization and party competitiveness in Mississippi. Combining the
implications from this literature, I seek to first find if there is correlation between
urbanization and party competitiveness in Mississippi, and second, if there are other
factors that are more influential on competition that urbanization.

Adam S. Vaughan, Eli Rosenberg, Luke Shouse, and Patrick Sullivan, “Connecting Race and
Place: A County-Level Analysis of White, Black, and Hispanic, HIV Prevalence, Poverty, and Level of
Urbanization,” American Journal of Public Health 104, No. 7 (July, 2014): 77-84, accessed March 28,
2016, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4056233/.
26
Russell Weaver and Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen, “Racially Polarized Voting in a Southern US
Election: How Urbanization and Residential Segregation Shape Voting Patterns,” The Review for Regional
Studies 45, no. 1 (September 2015): 15-34, accessed March 28, 2016,
http://journal.srsa.org/ojs/index.php/RRS/article/view/45.1.2/pdf.
25
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III. Methodology
As mentioned in the literature review, there many different ways to measure and
define urbanization, and each study tends to do it differently. Urbanization is “the process
by which towns and cities are formed and become larger as more and more people begin
living and working in central areas.”27 Since industrialization, urbanization has been a
growing phenomenon, not only in the United States, but also around the world. Over
time, the qualifications for what makes a city or town have changed, and still continues to
evolve.
With each new census, the Census Bureau modifies its definition of ‘urban.’ For
interpreting the 2010 census:
an urban area will comprise a densely settled core of census tracts and/or census
blocks that meet minimum population density requirements, along with adjacent
territory containing non-residential urban land uses as well as territory with low
population density included to link outlying densely settled territory with the
densely settled core. To qualify as an urban area, the territory identified
according to criteria must encompass at least 2,500 people, at least 1,500 of which
reside outside institutional group quarters.28

An urban area consists of 50,000 or more people, or has a population density of at
least 1,000 people per square mile. Census results are reported on the tract level, which is
typically the size of neighborhood and includes 2,500-8,000 people. In order for a tract to
be considered urban, it must have a population density equal to or more than 500 people
per square mile.29 While different scholars use different definitions for ‘urban’ and

27
Merriam- Webster, “Urbanization,” accessed March 31, 2015, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/urbanization.
28
“2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria,” United States Census
Bureau, last modified 2010, accessed March 31, 2015, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urbanrural-2010.html.
29
Ibid.
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‘rural,’ the majority of previous studies on urbanization have used the guidelines from the
Census Bureau because the most often used information on population comes from the
census. For consistency and clarity, this study will follow the same definitions as
provided by the Census Bureau.
As the primary case study for this project, I used the 2015 Mississippi House of
Representatives election, as all 122 seats were up for reelection. I chose the House of
Representative races over the Senate and other state-wide races because there are more of
those races, and I wanted to have a larger sample for more measurements. I used the
official election results from both the primary and general elections from the Mississippi
Secretary of State’s website,30 and calculated the percentage of votes the winning
candidate received. I used that percentage as the measurement of competitiveness among
the districts.
For each house district, I collected data on its population density of people per
square mile. I then took that number and the percentage of winning votes, and found the
summary statistics and regression line information for those variables. Originally, I only
ran regression for population density (urbanization) and percentage of votes the winning
candidate received (competitiveness). However, the results seemed to produce no
correlation or pattern between the two, so I decided to also collect data on other factors
that one could assume would affect party competition in elections. Because of what data
was available, I decided to add education and race as variables. For education, I found the
percentage of people over 25 years of age with a bachelor’s degree within each House

“Official 2015 Election Results,” Mississippi Secretary of State, accessed March 10, 2016,
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/2015-General-Election.aspx.
30

11

district, and for race I used the percentage of the population that is black. Those numbers
and statistics were found online from the US Census Bureau’s 2010 census.31
Once I had all of these numbers, I ran regression lines for each factor and the
percentage of votes the winner received (competitive factor), as well as a multiple
regression line including all four factors. These regression lines, however, did not yield
much with which to work. I then created scatter plots comparing the percentage of votes
the winning candidate received with the other three factors. Once I saw there were really
no linear correlations among any of the data sets, I then decided to see if there were
patterns among different levels of competitiveness.
I separated the 122 House districts into three groups: most competitive, semicompetitive, and not competitive. For the most competitive group, candidates had to have
received between 50 and 60% of the total votes; semi-competitive received between 60.1
and 99.9 % of total votes; and non-competitive received 100% of votes (only one party
ran a candidate). Within each group, I then calculated the mean population density, the
mean percentage of black population, and the mean percentage of people over 25 years of
age with a bachelor’s degree. I examined each variable against each district’s
competitiveness to see if any patterns occurred.
I also created scatterplots comparing the percentage of votes the winning
candidate received with the population, race, and education factors, but only using the
competitive groups and excluding races where the winner received 100% of the votes, in
effort to better explain competitiveness. From that data, I examined the patterns among
each of the three different groups.

31

Statistical Atlas, Cedar Lake Ventures, updated April 28, 2015,
http://statisticalatlas.com/United-States/Overview.
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Because such a large portion of the literature suggested redistricting as a possible
influence on competitiveness, I wanted to see if a relationship between redistricting and
party competitiveness existed in Mississippi. For that, I collected election results from the
2011 Mississippi House of Representatives elections. In the same way I did for the 2015
election results, I calculated the percentage of votes each winning candidate received, and
categorized them into three groups, ranging from most competitive to least competitive. I
then compared the number of competitive races from 2011 to those of 2015 to see if
redistricting in 2010 affected the number.
Mississippi redistricts every decade after the census. In Mississippi, the Joint
Legislative Commission on Reapportionment and Redistricting is responsible for creating
these lines. The committee consists of the chair and vice chair of both the House and
Senate election committees, two state Representatives from each congressional district
appointed by the Speaker of the House, and two state Senators from each congressional
district appointed by the Lieutenant Governor.32 New state legislative district lines have
to be approved as a joint resolution, and are free from the possibility of a gubernatorial
veto.33 The State Constitution requires that districts be compact, contiguous, and cross
political boundaries as little as possible. Other constraints may be altered by statute.34
Previous research suggests, however, that these constraints often make maps resemble
Republican gerrymanders, even when drawn by the opposite party.35

32

Miss. Code Ann. §§5-3-91, 5-3-121.
Miss. Constitution, Article XIII S 254.
34
Miss. Constitution, XII 254, MS code §5-3-1010.
35
David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests
in Congress, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.)
33
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IV. Results
Overall
The first data set I plotted was the percentage of votes the winning candidate of
each district received and the population densities of each district (Figure 1). The purpose
of this study was to see if, as suggested by the literature, as a legislative district became
more urban (the population density increased), the district would become more
competitive (the percentage of votes winner received would decrease). The results of the
scatter plot indicate that in Mississippi, no positive correlation exists between population
density and competitiveness.

Figure 1: Competitiveness and Population Density, All Districts

To better examine the results, I separated the 122 House districts into three
groups: Group 1, most competitive, where winning candidates received 50%- 60% of the
total vote; group 2, semi-competitive, with 60.1%- 99.9%; and group 3, non-competitive,
where the candidate ran unopposed and received 100% of the vote. Group 1 contained 12
districts, group 2 had 30 districts, and group 3 had 80 districts. Out of 122 state
legislative districts, 9.8% were highly competitive, 24.6% were semi-competitive, and
65.6% were not competitive. Within the three groups, I created new, separate scatter plots
14

for groups one and two, and and those plots also showed no clear patterns between
population density and competition.
Because population density did not yield much explanation as to what influences
competitiveness, I collected data on two other possible variables that seem likely to affect
elections in Mississippi: race and education. These numbers include the percentage of
blacks per district and the percentage of people over 25 years of age who hold a
Bachelor’s degree. I kept the districts separated into the three groups based on
competitiveness, and ran summary statistics on each group. I then found the mean
population density of people per square mile, the mean percentage of blacks, and the
mean percentage of people over 25 with at least Bachelor’s degree. Below is a table
showing those results for each group.

Population Density
% Black
% Bachelor’s

Group 1
80.83
24.95
16.7

Group 2
486.15
28.74
19.83

Group 3
399.56
42.49
20.72

Table 1: Mean Percentages of Population Density, Race, and Education

These summary statistics presented some surprising results. First, the most
competitive races, those in group one, had the lowest mean population density at only
80.83 people per square mile, classifying them as mostly rural. This is interesting because
it is the exact opposite of what I expected to find from the trend that was suggested in the
literature. Not only is group 1 the lowest population density, but it is lowest by a
significant difference. Group 3, the not competitive group, had the highest percentage of
blacks, by a fairly large percentage. This finding led me to further examine the
15

relationship between race and competition specifically in those districts, the results of
which will be discussed later in the paper. I was also surprised to see that the percentage
of people with a bachelor’s degree did not vary much among the groups; all three groups
were between 16% and 20%. I initially thought that increased percentages of education
would have resulted in increased competitiveness, but these results neither a positive nor
a negative correlation between the two.
By running statistical summaries on each of the three groups individually, I found
results that revealed patterns among groups with similar population densities, rather than
results that provided clear linear correlations between different factors.

Population Density
The semi-competitive districts, in group 2, had the highest average population
density with 486.15 people per square mile. Group 3 was close behind, with an average
of 399.56 people per square mile. As I mentioned earlier, the fact that the least
competitive districts have the highest population densities is surprising because it
diverges from the ‘norm.’ After examining the districts within groups 2 and 3, I noticed
there were a couple of districts with extremely high population densities that were
skewing the means of each group. I removed the two highest extremes of population
density from each group—all over 1800—and I then recalculated the mean densities. For
group three, the average decreased to 343.6 people, not much of a significant decrease.
Group two, which had the highest density, decreased to 109.19 people, a quite significant
drop. New scatter plots were created to reflect the districts with the two extremes
removed.

16

Figure 2: Competitiveness and Population Density, Group 1

Figure 3: Competitiveness and Population Density, Group 2

When districts are grouped together by competitiveness, one can see different
patterns. Figure 2 indicates that among the competitive districts, districts do tend to
become more competitive as the density increases. While that does align with the original
hypothesis, the correlation is insignificant because the range of the densities is small. The
populations are not different enough to indicate a clear correlation. Figure 3 indicates no
clear correlation between competitiveness and population density. The ranges of all three
groups are worth noting. Group one has a range of 539, while group two has a range of
2,005, and group three has one of 3,313. The range matters because the lower the range,

17

the more similar the districts are in population density. If competitiveness drastically
changes among districts with very similar densities, density becomes more of a constant
and rather than a factor of competitiveness.

Education
The next potential factor examined was education. For this, I used the percentage
of people over 25 years of age who had a Bachelor’s degree or higher in each district. I
believed that education would be a factor in competitiveness, and that as the percentage
of people with an education, specifically those who held at least a Bachelor’s degree,
increased, so would the amount of competition. However, the summary statistics the
showed little variation between groups; group one had 16.7%, group 2 had 19.83%, and
group 3 had 20.72%. Overall, that is only a 4% change, and there seems to be a slightly
negative correlation between the two. Below, figure 4 shows the results from the first two
groups. Group three was excluded in efforts to examine the trend among ‘competitive’
districts.

Figure 4: Competitiveness and Education, All Districts
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To have a closer look at the indicated pattern, I made a new scatter plot examining
the left side of the chart, or those districts with less that 35% of people with a Bachelor’s
degree. Figure 5 shows a slight correlation that as the percentage of people over 25 years
of age with a Bachelor’s degree increases, competitiveness tends to decrease. However,
much like with population density, the correlation is not strong enough to be considered
very statistically significant.

Figure 5: Competitiveness and Education, Less than 35%

Race
For each group, I also calculated the percentage of the population that was black.
According to the 2010 census, Mississippi is comprised of 37.5% of African
Americans.36 The competitive groups—1 and 2—both had lower percentages than the
state average; group 1 had 24.95% and group 2 had 28.74%, while group 3 had 42.49%.
The ranges for the districts within each group varied as well. For group 1, the range was
33.1%. That may seem like a large variation, but the other two group ranges were much

“Quickfacts: Mississippi,” United States Census Bureau, accessed March 25, 2016,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/28.
36
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higher; group two’s range was 72.8%, and group three was 82.7%. From this, one could
conclude that the higher percentage of a black population a district has, the less
competitive it is. While the scatter plot below does not fit that conclusion very well, one
can see that out of all of the factors examined, race seems to be the most influential and
provides the best indicator of how competitive an area will be.

Figure 6: Competitiveness and Race, All Districts

Figure 7 indicates several different things. First, the number of non-competitive
districts is split almost in half between populations with less than 50% blacks, and those
with more than 50%. Second, while there is no linear correlation for all of the data, there
is a correlation for districts with black populations over 50%. Below, I graphed just the
competitive districts with black populations over 50%. After a threshold of about 55%,
one can conclude that as the percentage of the black population in a district increases, the
competitiveness decreases.
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Figure 7: Competitiveness and Race, Greater than 50% Black

After looking into these five districts, I found that four of the five representatives
were black themselves, and all five were members of the Democratic Party. This
indicates a relationship between race and party affiliation. It also indicates that if the
candidate is the same race as the majority, competitiveness decreases. In a state like
Mississippi with a long racial history, it seems correct that of the three factors examined,
race seems to be the most influential, and that future studies could focus on the voting
patterns of different races to help determine competitiveness.

Geography
Another interesting finding was the geographic location of the group 1
competitive districts. When located on the Mississippi House of Representatives district
map, all but one of the 2015 competitive districts is adjacent to another competitive
district (See Map 1). This is pattern is also consistent in the 2011 House of
Representatives races, with the exception a a few races (See map 2). All of those pairs are
not located in the same area in Mississippi, but in different clusters around the state. To
me, that suggests that certain local factors, even down to the county or neighborhood
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level, may play a more influential role in increasing competitiveness than state-wide
factors.

Redistricting
Competitiveness within a district is largely determined by the types of voters
within a particular district. The voting population in a specific district is largely
determined by how the district lines are drawn through redistricting, making it hard to
study competitiveness without considering redistricting. The latest Mississippi House of
Representatives district lines were adopted in May of 2012. To see if redistricting
affected competitiveness, I used the 2011 Mississippi House of Representative elections
and categorized them into three groups like I did with the 2015 races. Below is a chart
comparing the number of highly competitive, somewhat competitive, and not competitive
races in both cycles, using the same percentage definitions of each, where 50% - 59.9% is
highly competitive, 100% is not competitive, and between 60% and 99.9% is somewhat
competitive.

2011

2015

Highly competitive

16.39%

9.84%

Somewhat competitive

25.41%

24.59%

Not competitive

58.2%

65.57%

Table 2: 2011 and 2015 Average Percentages of Competitive Groups
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These percentages show that after redistricting in 2012, the number of competitive
districts decrease, and the number of not competitive districts increased, both by
substantial amounts. However, the district lines changed significantly between the two
cycles, and several of the districts are in completely different locations. This made the
data I have from the two election years nearly incomparable because the other factors—
race, density, and education—would be different because of the change of location. Due
to that discrepancy, this study cannot conclusively say how or if redistricting affected
competitiveness among parties. It can, however, point out that redistricting did occur
between the two election cycles, and that the latter resulted in lower percentages of
competitiveness. Redistricting seems to be an important factor, and should be noted for
future studies.
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V. Conclusion
Political scientists categorized 2015 as a year with record low competitiveness
among different political parties.37 Previous research on party competitiveness found a
correlation between urbanization and competition: that as an area urbanizes, its races
become more competitive.38 The purpose of this study was to apply that hypothesis to
Mississippi and see if it remained true in a state with low urbanization. Using the 2011
Mississippi House of Representatives races as the main case study, this study concluded
that there is no positive correlation between urbanization and party competitiveness in
Mississippi.
Because that hypothesis did not seem to apply to Mississippi, I then sought to find
which factors are most influential on party competitiveness, specifically education and
race. After gathering the data for those categories in each House district, I concluded that
of the different factors examined, the percentage of blacks in a district was the best
indicator of party competitiveness. Specifically, the higher the black population, the less
competitive a district tends to be.
That leads to the question of why a high black population correlates with lack of
competitiveness. I believe it can be explained by party affiliation. In Mississippi, African
American voters tend to vote similarly as a race. Typically, this voting bloc identifies
most closely with the Democratic Party.39 Elections in districts with high black

37
“2015 state legislative elections analyzed using a Competitiveness Index,” Ballotpedia, accessed
March 11, 2016,
https://ballotpedia.org/2015_state_legislative_elections_analyzed_using_a_Competitiveness_Index.
38
Bonjean and Lineberry, 1970.
39
Frank Newport, “Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mainly White,” Gallup, February 8,
2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white.aspx.
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populations typically result in strong Democratic Party wins, and label those districts as
low competitive districts.
Of the twelve districts in group 1 that were considered most competitive, all of the
general elections were between two white candidates. This is interesting because it
further helps show how race affects competitiveness. Districts were most competitive
when the races were not split racially, with one black and one white candidate, but when
the candidates were of the same race, specifically white. Most of these districts were not
all white constituencies either; black populations ranged from 6.5% to 36.8%. I believe
this indicates that the African American vote is quite influential, specifically in races
where their voter behavior must be party affiliated rather than race affiliated.
As discussed earlier, the most competitive districts have similarities: they are
more white and more rural than the others. I think those similarities exist for a few
reasons. First, while many white voters do identify as Republican, it is not nearly as
strong as the black voter identification with the Democratic party.40 In some of these
dominantly white districts, party affiliation is split between both Democrats and
Republicans, where as in dominantly black districts, the electorate is typically
overwhelmingly Democratic. Second, the ‘rural’ aspect is important. According to the US
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, rural places are usually poorer
than urbanized areas.41 Research also suggests that poorer people tend to affiliate more
often with the Democratic party.42 So in these districts that are white and rural, which I

40

Newport, 2013.
Tracey Farrigan, “Geography of Poverty,” United States Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Services, December 17, 2015, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/ruralpoverty-well-being/geography-of-poverty.aspx.
42
“The Politics of Financial Insecurity: A Democratic Tilt, Undercut by Low Participation,” Pew
Research Center, January 8, 2015, http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/08/the-politics-of-financialinsecurity-a-democratic-tilt-undercut-by-low-participation/.
41
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initially assumed would be the strongest Republican districts, competition tends to
increase because the votes are split between parties.
This study added a new dimension to existing research on urbanization and
political party competitiveness because little research had been conducted on the two
together in the past several decades, and no research had been conducted specifically on
Mississippi races. This project also produced further research opportunities for future
projects, specifically regarding the sections on the effect redistricting has on party
competitiveness and the role in which race and party affiliation play in determining the
competitiveness of a district.
I believe multi-party competition is an important aspect of a democracy for two
main reasons. First, the competitiveness of a race increases voter turnout because voters
believe their votes are more important in close races.43 Voters are more likely to vote if
they believe their vote matters. Second, if a seat is competitive, politicians will have to
work harder to win that seat, and as a result, will be more likely to try to better represent
the constituency because it is more likely they will be voted out of office. If
competitiveness promotes increased voter turnout and better constituency relations, it
seems that competitiveness within a district is a good. However, for candidates and their
campaigns, a more competitive seat often means more effort and money put into the
campaign, while also creating more uncertainty about winning reelection for incumbents.
Competitiveness can also be a negative for state governments who want to keep the
current party in power. No politician would want to increase competition if he or she
knew that it would result in his or her party losing certain offices. Whether one believes

What affects Voter Turnout Rates?” FairVote, March 2013,
http://www.fairvote.org/what_affects_voter_turnout_rates.
43
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party competitiveness is positive or negative, understanding the factors that increase or
decrease competition is imperative for better controlling the outcomes of elections. This
study steps in the direction of understanding those factors.
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